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The large changes experienced by European exchange rates certainly had large
ex post wealth and welfare effects. It is not difficult to define and measure
official reserve losses during the buildup of a currency crisis: as a loss of re-
serves entails an exchange of foreign-currency-denominated assets for
domestic-currency-denominated ones, it is equally straightforward, in prin-
ciple, to evaluate the accounting loss that ensues from eventual devaluation in
a central bank's balance sheet that, through intervention, has become heavily
exposed to exchange rate depreciation. Of course, exchange rate policy is pri-
marily aimed at longer-run macroeconomic issues, and public-sector losses
from devaluation are trivial from that perspective. From a microeconomic
point of view, however, gains and losses in the central bank's balance sheets
correspond to very real losses and gains in private-sector balance sheets: if the
devaluation does occur after the loss of reserves, "speculators" earn capital
gains; symmetrically, as long as the devaluation does not occur, high domestic
interest rates hurt the private sector if monetary policy is tightened while yield-
ing (accounting) profits for the central bank.
At the empirical level, this perspective brings forth many difficult and rela-
tively unexplored issues. In central banks' balance sheets, assets whose coun-
terpart is in a resident agent's balance sheet ("domestic credit") are denomi-
nated in domestic currency, while "reserves," whose counterpart appears in
foreign balance sheets, are denominated in foreign currency. Private-sector bal-
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ance sheets, however, need not feature the same coincidence. Beyond standard
balance-of-payments statistics based on an increasingly ill-defined distinction
between "resident" and "nonresident" agents in a world of high capital mobil-
ity, only scant evidence is available on the currency and counterpart structure
of various private agents' balance sheets.
At the theoretical level, standard models of exchange rate crises are silent
on many of the relevant issues: the counterpart of central bank reserve changes
is taken to be portfolio reallocation by a single representative agent and is
driven by current and/or expected monetary policy developments (for a recent
survey, see Obstfeld [1994]). Introspection and data, however, suggest that dif-
ferent individuals' and institutions' financial positions are differently exposed
to the risk of devaluations in reality. The widely cited "convergence play" in
the period of relative stability leading up to the ERM (exchange rate mecha-
nism) crises, namely, the fact that portfolio managers would try and take ad-
vantage of large interest rate differentials between "weak-" and "strong-"
currency-denominated assets (see, e.g., IMF 1993, chap. 3), is itself evidence
of heterogeneity in the financial market: whereas the attempt to take advantage
of apparent arbitrage opportunities would lead to interest rate convergence in
an equilibrium representative-agent model, interest rate differentials persisted
in the precrisis ERM, to indicate that other agents ("speculators") were betting
on "divergence."
In this paper, we study interactions among optimizing agents and a central
bank in an environment where a devaluation may occur with exogenously
given probability. This has two advantages. On the one hand, exchange rate
crises may be viewed as "controlled experiments" for the difficult task of mod-
eling heterogeneous portfolio formation. On the other hand, focusing on deval-
uations makes it possible to frame the analysis in terms of two periods ("be-
fore" and "after" the devaluation) and to disregard ongoing dynamics to the
extent possible. Our approach is intermediate between that of standard macro-
economic models, where exchange rate policy is viewed as a game between
willful monetary authorities and a single "public" body, and that of more recent
"microstructure" contributions concerned with individual traders' minute-by-
minute problems (see Lyons, chap. 5 in this volume, and the references
therein). In our analysis, we do not focus on fundamentals as much as the
former literature does: we shall not try to interpret the monetary authorities'
behavior, and monetary and exchange rate policies are exogenous to our ap-
proach. In contrast to the "microstructure" approach, we explicitly model the
behavior of the market's main actors, who provide inputs to the traders and
intermediaries on which those complementary contributions focus.
To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we model optimization in terms
of a mean-variance return objective, abstracting from the portion of wealth
allocation that is not directly relevant for our problem. We pay close attention
to the structure of each agent's balance sheet, treat it as the outcome of individ-
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available assets. These features are essential to any framework intended to in-
vestigate devaluation gains and losses: as these depend on the structure of bal-
ance sheets, the model should be able to explain why agents other than the
central bank (whose behavior is taken to be exogenous) were caught by the
devaluation with a specific asset and liability structure.
In our stylized model, devaluation expectations are uniform across agents.
Of course, this is not uncontroversial (see Frankel and Rose 1994, sec. V, and
the references therein). We prefer to allow for heterogeneity in more directly
interpretable respects, namely, for differences in risk aversion, asset prefer-
ence, and need for liquidity. Heterogeneous objectives lead different agents to
take different positions in domestic and foreign assets and to react differently
to changes in the perceived probability of devaluation. To the extent that our
stylized agents may be taken to represent households, firms, financial institu-
tions, and central banks, the model can be used to interpret certain characteris-
tics of the data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 7.1 motivates our work with a
review of readily available evidence on the Italian lira crisis in 1992. A first
look at standard balance-of-payments statistics indicates that domestic banks,
domestic nonbank investors, and foreign investors did contribute differently to
official reserve losses. The theoretical analysis is organized in two main sec-
tions and several subsections. Section 7.2 sets up an accounting framework
for the study of financial interactions among a central bank and a number of
heterogeneous investors. In section 7.3, several elements of heterogeneity are
considered and their implications in terms of portfolio choices and resulting
gains and losses from devaluation evaluated. Section 7.4 goes back to the data,
specifically to a variety of disaggregated statistics available in the Italian case.
1
We discuss the extent to which the peculiarities noted in section 7.1 may be
rationalized by our theoretical considerations and the more disaggregated evi-
dence. A concluding section summarizes the main findings and indicates direc-
tions for further research.
7.1 The Crisis of September 1992 in Italy
Our modeling perspective may be suitably applied to any period in which
agents assign a positive (and nonnegligible) probability to the event of a
change in the EMS parity grid. In this paper, we consider the lira exchange rate
crisis of September 1992 and the summer months leading up to it. After some
years of remarkable stability in the foreign exchange market (the most recent
1. We attempted to obtain similar statistics for other countries. Some Swedish data were kindly
made available to us and may be considered in future work along the lines of this paper. Contacts
with French and British central bank officials led to pleasant conversations, but no hard informa-
tion. The officials we met readily acknowledged that the issues we focus on are of some impor-
tance and that balance-of-payment statistics throw very little light on them. Yet no better data
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exchange rate crisis, leading to a devaluation of the lira, was in 1987), wide-
spread fear of a realignment within the EMS (European Monetary System)
originated from the negative and unexpected result of the Danish referendum
on 2 June 1992.
2 The following four months witnessed sizable portfolio reallo-
cations by various agents, with corresponding large changes in the reserve po-
sition of the central bank. This section provides a brief description of the
events, highlighting the main facts that may motivate our theoretical analysis.
The first thing to note is that June 1992 marks a change of some of the
trends in capital movements characterizing the preceding months. In fact, the
completion of the process of gradual capital movements liberalization in 1990
(together with the adoption of the "narrow band" within the ERM in January
of the same year, supporting expectations of exchange rate stability) favored a
protracted large outflow of domestic nonbanking capital (by more than
L 48,000 billion in 1991), mainly due to portfolio reallocations of households
and financial companies and a heavy inflow of foreign funds (by almost 37,000
billion). Notwithstanding the conspicuous deficit of the current account,
amounting to 26,500 billion, the loss of foreign reserves of the Bank of Italy
was limited to some 8,500 billion owing to the large inflow of foreign currenc-
ies through the banking sector.
Between January and May 1992, the cumulative outflow of nonbanking do-
mestic capital amounted to 39,100 billion and was offset by a net inflow of
banking-sector capital of more than 35,000 billion. With a cumulative current-
account deficit of 17,200 billion, foreign capital inflows of 17,500 billion (and
small errors and omissions) limited the loss of central bank reserves to 6,300
billion.
The Danish no vote in the referendum on the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty on 2 June marked the beginning of the EMS crisis: foreign exchange
market participants, which had largely disregarded the fundamentals of ERM
members, became more responsive to certain countries' macroeconomic dis-
equilibria and their possibilities of converging according to schedule. The cri-
sis led to the abandonment of the ERM by the lira and the British pound in
mid-September.
In the three months between June and August, there is evidence of differ-
ences in the behavior of the banking and nonbanking sectors of the Italian
economy. In the face of a generalized rise in the perceived probability of a
parity realignment within the EMS, different positions were taken by different
agents. Figure 7.1 plots the monthly reserve loss of the Bank of Italy between
February and December 1992, along with its determinants from balance-of-
payments statistics. The distance between the solid line and the thick dashed
line measures domestic financial intermediaries' capital flows: between June
and August, this component sustained the financing needs of the Bank of Italy,
2. The data in table 5 in Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) indicate that almost 50 percent of
surveyed dealers "first thought a change in ERM exchange rate was imminent" after the Danish ref-
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Fig. 7.1 Italy's balance of payments, 1992
with a cumulative inflow of about 15,000 billion. Apart from the current ac-
count deficit (about 3,500 billion in cumulative terms), the bank's reserve
losses were reflected in a private-sector capital outflow totaling 21,400 billion
(or 33,000 billion including errors and omissions, which may at least in part
represent transactions by families).
3
In early September, growing uncertainty in the run-up to the French referen-
dum acted as a catalyst for the launching of speculative attacks, providing them
with a fixed date. After heavy intervention by the Bundesbank and the Bank of
Italy, and after an increase of 1.75 points in the discount rate, the lira was
devalued by 6.76 percent on 13 September. After that, the Germans decreased
the lombard by 0.25 and the discount by 0.5. A new attack was launched on 16
September; Britain left the ERM, Italy suspended the intervention limits, the
peseta was devalued by 5 percent.
From the balance-of-payments data of figure 7.1, which are available only
on a monthly basis, we see that the crisis brought about a dramatic reserve
outflow (minus 30,000 billion in September). Even more strikingly, this out-
flow was matched by banking-sector capital outflows by 26,000 billion: non-
banking capital flows were negligible over the month, even accounting for er-
rors and omissions, while the current account deficit was similar to those of
previous months at 4,800 billion.
We feel that the remarkable apparent switch in domestic banks' portfolio
3. The balance-of-payments statistics do not register capital transactions unless they are carried
out through authorized currency dealers, i.e., banks. Moreover, banks and individuals are not re-
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choices deserves further attention at both the statistical and the theoretical lev-
els. In interpreting the data displayed in the figure, however, one encounters
various problems. First of all, the balance-of-payments data register end-of-
period positions. The negligible change in private portfolio choices within the
month of September might well hide offsetting movements before and after
the devaluation. The lira/deutsche mark official parity was devalued by 7 per-
cent on 13 September, and the exchange rate continued to depreciate after the
abandonment of the ERM on 17 September. Speculation against the lira before
each of those dates, and profit taking thereafter, would not be apparent in the
available data. Second, the balance of payments registers only those transac-
tions involving foreign counterparts. In a world of not only free capital mobil-
ity but also extensive financial deregulation, positions involving currency risk
are routinely taken among agents based in the same country, while interna-
tional transactions may well be denominated in either (or third) currencies.
Data at higher-than-monthly frequencies are not available to us (nor indeed
to the Bank of Italy itself). However, the exchange rate policy arm of the Bank
of Italy (Ufficio Italiano Cambi, or UIC, which is in charge of such statistics)
does maintain and publish extensive records of banks' foreign-currency posi-
tions with both foreign and domestic counterparts. We analyze such data in
section 7.4 below, after a brief analysis of several theoretical issues. The very
existence of banks, in fact, requires that economic agents be heterogeneous,
for otherwise no transactions would occur except those involving the central
bank. Accordingly, in the next section we formulate a simple model where
agents may be heterogeneous under a variety of respects.
7.2 Theoretical Considerations
We begin by studying the balance sheets of the various agents. This is useful
to provide an accounting framework that may connect the portfolio positions
of different agents. We do not consider the complete structure of assets and
liabilities: instead, we focus on the financial positions that are relevant to the
problem at hand. In the simple structure with which we begin, there is one
central bank and one private agent. The private agent obtains credit from the
central bank in two different currencies and repays the debt at the end of the
period.
At time 0, the central bank's balance sheet reads (normalizing initial net
worth to zero)
(1) do+foxo = mo.
On the left-hand side of (1), the central bank's assets include domestic credit
d0 and foreign-exchange reserves, which amount to/0 in foreign-currency terms
and are converted into domestic currency at the initial exchange rate x0. On the
right-hand side of (1), we have (domestic) high-powered money, m0. All terms
are expressed in units of domestic currency.
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currency denomination, not on whether the counterpart of those assets is a
resident of the domestic country or a foreign subject. In practice, however,
domestic credit has resident counterpart and is in domestic currency; reserves
have a nonresident counterpart and are in foreign currency. Throughout our
discussion, we do not explicitly account for any agent's forward positions:
there is no need to do so, in fact, as a forward position can be viewed as a
combination of borrowing and lending in different currencies.
The relevant portion of the public's balance sheet, also expressed in domes-
tic currency, is a mirror image of the central bank's:
(2) m0 = d0+f0x0.
Other assets and liabilities are also present but (by definition) net out to zero
and will be irrelevant to our analysis. The economy's representative agent holds
(domestic) money for transaction purposes and finances the long money posi-
tion by shorting both domestic- and foreign-currency assets on the right-hand
side. Below we discuss the criteria that are used to make optimal decisions.
We consider only two periods or, better, an initial and a final position that
might be thought of as embedded in an ongoing cash-in-advance sequence of
models. Between time 0 and time 1, each (domestic-currency) unit of domestic
credit yields a nominal interest i, while each (foreign-currency) unit of reserves
yields nominal interest i*. For simplicity, money pays no interest but is held
for transaction purposes.
At time 1, the exchange rate is xv and assets mature with interest. The ex-
change rate change (if any) and interest payments are reflected in two net-
worth items shown in the balance sheets at time 1:
(3) 4,(1 + 0 +/0(l + **)*, = m0 + w«,
(4) m0 = 4,(1 + 0 +/0(l + Z*)JC, + w*,
when expressed in domestic currency. There are now terms wf
B and w] that
account for a positive or negative net wealth at the end of period 1, as a conse-
quence of movements of the exchange rate and of interest rate payments. Of
course nf
B = — w*: if there are only two agents, the gains of one are the losses
of the other. We assume that the exchange rate at time 1 is determined on the
basis of elements that are outside the control of the central bank, which does
not have an objective function to maximize, and of the private agent.
7.2.1 Portfolio Choice
The central bank need not be concerned with its time 1 net worth, as mone-
tary policy objectives probably dominate them.
4 Conversely, each individual
member of the public gains utility from a low expected cost of debt and suffers
disutility from a high variance of the same quantity. We specify the public's
4. The return on central bank assets affects the public sector's net worth and, eventually, the
private sector's tax bill. Atomistic individual investors, however, have little reason to worry about
that when deciding on their portfolio allocation.236 Fabio C. Bagliano, Andrea Beltratti, and Giuseppe Bertola
objective function in terms of rates of return, and this can be interpreted as a
second-order Taylor approximation of a constant relative risk-aversion utility
function.
5 Let gross real returns be given by
(5) r=l+i-(xl- l)o>
on domestic-currency denominated financial instruments and
(6) r* = 1 + i* + (x, - 1)(1 - co)
on the asset denominated in foreign currency. To simplify notation, we normal-
ize the initial exchange rate to unity: while x0 would in general be endogenous
in a floating-rate situation, it is exogenously given in the precrisis EMS situa-
tion that we consider (if we abstract from within-band fluctuations), and
it is harmless to normalize x0 — 1. This specification also implies that the
same correction is done to the returns of the two assets after these have been
translated to either currency; in fact, one can think of the correction done to
the return on foreign assets as the sum of the two components (x{ - 1) and
-co(jCj - 1), the former necessary for going from foreign to domestic currency,
the latter common to both assets and representing the net deduction that has to
be made to domestic-currency net worth to express the individual's wealth in
real terms.
The parameter co determines how important exchange rate risk is for the
investor's marginal utility of wealth. The representative investor derives utility
from wealth expressed in domestic currency if co = 0; at the other extreme,
only the foreign-currency value of time 1 net worth matters if co = 1; and 0 <
co < 1 indexes intermediate cases.
In standard finance-theoretic models with independently distributed asset
returns and non-purchasing power parity (PPP) goods-price inflation, the
weight co of the exchange rate in the investor's price index corresponds to his
consumption-basket weight of goods priced in foreign currency (for a particu-
larly clear exposition and references to earlier literature, see Dumas [1994]).
This interpretation need not be appropriate in the extremely short-run perspec-
tive that we take in this paper: at the (say) weekly horizon when portfolio
choices are made, the prices of both domestic and foreign goods are essentially
fixed and independent of exchange rate developments. However, portfolio
managers and investment returns are evaluated in terms of precise and presum-
ably different currency denominations: German mutual funds aim to show
good results in deutsche mark terms, and Italian banks aim to optimize net
worth in lira terms. In general, this may be rationalized recognizing that asset
returns, depreciation rates, and inflation rates are driven by underlying macro-
5. For a similar approximation, which usefully simplifies the algebra in a discrete-time frame-
work, see Dornbusch (1983). For an extensive treatment of the relevant issues, see Adler and
Dumas (1983). For a more rigorous discrete-time treatment, see Dumas (1994). Frankel (1986)
and others have proposed macroeconomic and empirical applications of similar models.237 Heterogeneous Behavior in Exchange Rate Crises
economic state variables. Thus, the relevance of short-term exchange rate de-
velopments to investment evaluation is mediated by their underlying relevance
to the whole future path of utility-relevant prices and quantities. Formally, the
adjustment represented by w refers to the wealth (rather than consumption)
deflator that is appropriate when the underlying state variables' evolution re-
sults in an exchange rate equal to x, at the end of the period. An Italian investor
may be particularly concerned with lira returns and set w = 0 if the domestic
currency is lira, not because he consumes only lira-price goods at time 1 (he
may consume all sorts of goods, whose prices are anyway essentially constant
at the weekly forecast horizon), but because the marginal value of time 1
wealth in his dynamic problem is high when lira assets do well (the lira ap-
preciates relative to expectations), low when lira assets do poorly. However, the
opposite might be true with a different assumption about the marginal utility
of wealth in the two states, which would imply that a large w is attached to
domestic investors.
We specify a mean-variance objective function in rates-of-return terms and
model the transaction services of high-powered money by an increasing and
concave function T(-). Thus, the public's time 0 objective function reads
(7) max(T(m0) + mAE[l - Xr - (1 - X)r*]
where E denotes the expectations operator, V the variance operator, and X is
the share of initial debt denominated in domestic currency (there is no coeffi-
cient on the expectation, which just reflects normalization of T[-] and 7).
Taking as given the rates of return and the distribution of the time 1 exchange
rate, the public optimally chooses the amount of money held for transactions
and portfolio composition. Our specification allows for a separation of the
portfolio and of the initial debt problems: the investor chooses how much
money to hold for transaction purposes, at which stage he needs to know how
costly (in risk-adjusted terms) it is to finance money holdings; for each amount
of money holdings, however, the portfolio shares are determined indepen-
dently of the choice of initial debt. As we will see later, in general this does
not imply that in equilibrium money demand is independent of the portfolio
composition.
To model the EMS precollapse situation, we let
{
1 + A with probability p,
1 with probability (1 — p),
where A is the (nonrandom) amount by which the domestic currency depreci-
ates if the initial parity is abandoned. (We could let this be random, with mess-
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The expected returns, variances, and covariances of domestic and foreign
assets are easily computed:
Er= 1 + i- /?Aco, Vr = (coA)
2/?(l - p),
Er* = 1 + i* + (1 - a))pA, Vr* = [(1 - co)A]
2/?(l - p),
COV(A; r*) = -w(l - co)A
2/?(l - p).
As for the role of portfolio composition, the expected overall opportunity
cost of money holdings is, in gross terms,
1 + i* + \(i - i* - pA) + (1 - <a)pA
if the investor puts a share X in domestic liabilities; the corresponding variance
of realized returns is given by
and equals zero if X = 1 — co (minimum variance portfolio).
The derivative of the expected return with respect to X is Ap — i + i* and
that of the return variance is 2A
2p(l — p)(k + co — 1). Hence, to maximize the
objective function (7), the portfolio share must satisfy the first-order condition
Ap- i + i* - 7 \A
2p(l - p)(k + co - 1) | = 0,
from which we obtain
(8) X = (1 - co) - —
yA
2p(l — p)
If 7 —> 0, then X diverges to plus or minus infinity according to the sign of
the uncovered interest rate differential; if 7 —» °°, then X -> 1 — co.
As for money demand, we have
(9) T'(m0) + [-/* - \(i - i* - pA) - (1 - co)/>A]
- ^ {A
2/?(l - p)[\ - (1 - co)]
2} = 0,
or, considering (8),




In the presence of risk aversion, the choice about the amount of initial debt
depends on expected return and variance. Thus, the simple theoretical frame-
work that we consider integrates money-demand and portfolio-choice aspects.
Specifically, money demand turns out to depend, first, on a weighted average
of the rates of return on assets denominated in the two currencies, with weights
given by the asset-preference parameter co, and, second, on a downward adjust-239 Heterogeneous Behavior in Exchange Rate Crises
ment of opportunity costs by a "speculative" term, which is an increasing func-
tion of the absolute deviation from uncovered interest parity (normalized by
the exchange rate variance) and a decreasing function of the agent's degree of
risk aversion: intuitively, an agent who is not infinitely risk averse will be able,
by taking a "speculative" position, to reduce the financing cost of money
holdings.
7.3 Market Equilibrium and Heterogeneity
While individuals are price takers and quantity setters, in equilibrium quan-
tity and/or interest rates must adjust to their optimal choices. In a representa-
tive-agent framework of analysis, equation (8) would immediately determine
the equilibrium risk premium as a function of the relative quantities of the
two liabilities in the central bank's balance sheet; financial market equilibrium
requires that
(11) i - i* - /?A = 7A
2p(l - p) [(1 - a>) - \l
The risk premium is equal to zero, of course, if asset supplies form a minimum
variance portfolio for the representative investor; otherwise, the market must
bear some risk and be compensated for it. If \ > (1 — <o), then i must be low,
for any given /?A, since investors want to be compensated with a lower cost
of debt in order to keep in their portfolio a share of domestic liability that is
larger than the one corresponding to their asset-preference parameter. If X <
(1 - a)), conversely, investors compete for domestic-currency debt and bid up
the interest rate it pays.
It is interesting to go beyond the standard representative-agent framework
and try and rationalize the exchange rate crisis as the equilibrium outcome of
interactions among heterogeneous agents. In reality, of course, there are very
many potential sources of heterogeneity. The variables that we choose to em-
phasize in the model are the coefficient of risk aversion ~y, the asset-preference
parameter w, which the agent uses to transform nominal returns into real re-
turns, and the objective function.
In general, we may consider J investors with different coefficients w
0
) and
7° > and heterogeneous optimal portfolio shares given by
In market equilibrium, we must have
from which an expression for the risk premium is readily obtained:240 Fabio C. Bagliano, Andrea Beltratti, and Giuseppe Bertola
(13) i - i* - Ap = p{\ - p)A
2
The structure that we have described can be further enriched by modifying
the objective function of some agents. In what follows, we consider the case
of an intermediary, characterized by lack of demand for money owing to ab-
sence of transaction purposes. This intermediary has reasons to exist in equilib-
rium, as it helps close the gap between the supply structure of the central bank
and the demand structure of the private agents. The balance sheet of such an
intermediary is
where on the left we have the supply of the central bank and on the right we
have the demand of the public. Net worth at time 1 is
<> = (80 - do)(l + i) + (lQ -/0)(l + i*)xv
The portion of the (purely speculative) objective function regarding expected
returns is
+ 80 + xoy \foxo + dj \foxo + d = E[\
(I)(r - r*)],
where we use the fact that 80 + xo£o = foxQ + d0 and the notation
0K(L) = Q
By considering an objective function that also considers the variance of re-







) is the coefficient of risk aversion of the intermediary. Equation (14)
shows that demand of the intermediary completely ignores the minimum vari-
ance portfolio and requires a risk premium for intermediating between the
structures of the balance sheets of the central bank and the public. In the ab-
sence of such a risk premium, X
(/
) = 0, or X.
(A
) = K
(L\ and there is no economic
role for the intermediary as the structure of his assets is identical with that of
his liabilities.
The equilibrium condition for a market with both an intermediary and many
heterogeneous private agents is




Am = £ K
J)m
l» - \
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It follows that the equilibrium risk premium is now
\
(15) i - i* - A/? = A
2p(l -
We see in (13) and in (15) that even the simple framework that we have been
considering yields complicated equilibrium interactions between the various
parameters. Moreover, money demand on the part of each agent is a function
of the interest rates and of the various parameters, making it even more difficult
to obtain sharp and general results. Suppose, for example, that one is interested
in analyzing in the general case the reaction of the investors to a change in the
probability of devaluation. The natural thing to do is to look at the demand
function, equation (12), which, however, shows the importance of the risk pre-
mium. But equation (15) points out that the reaction of the equilibrium risk
premium to a change in the probability of devaluation depends on the money
demands of all the agents, in turn a function of the shares of the debts denomi-
nated in the two currencies. Lacking a closed-form solution, we set up two
simple cases as candidates for understanding the patterns that we may see in
the data.
As we are interested in heterogeneity in the behavior of the agents as a reac-
tion to changes in the probability of devaluation, we note that there are two
factors in the structure of our model that may give rise to heterogeneity: on the
one hand, changes in money demand (a scale effect); on the other, changes in
the composition of portfolios (a share effect). In general, the two are interre-
lated, but, to build intuition, it is useful to consider each of them in isolation.
7.3.1 No Intermediary, No Risk Premium, Different Asset Preference
The first simple case that we consider is that where there are only two invest-
ors, which we regard as "domestic" (superscript D) and "foreign" (superscript
F), respectively, and no intermediary. Further, we suppose that the structure of
the supply of the central bank is such as to eliminate the risk premium, that is,
S/=1(l - (xi
U))m
U) = d0. In this case, uncovered interest rate parity holds, that
is, i — i* + pA, and the optimal share for each investor, from equation (12),
equals the minimum variance portfolio. Also from equation (10), we see that
money demand has a simple structure, j'(m
U)) = u)
0)z* + (1 — oo
0))z, for both
the domestic and the foreign investors.
What is the effect of an exogenous increase in p if u>
(F) ¥= a)
(D)? The scale
effect can be seen clearly from equation (10), where the last fraction is equal
to zero in light of uncovered interest parity: for given /*, an increase in/? brings
about an increase in the domestic interest rate, and this in turn decreases money
demand. It follows that an increase in p decreases the stock of money. If the
structure of the supply of the central bank does not change, then there is a
decrease in the amounts of both domestic and foreign liabilities of the central242 Fabio C. Bagliano, Andrea Beltratti, and Giuseppe Bertola
bank. The latter can be interpreted as a loss of reserves on the part of the central
bank. The share effect is absent, as the desired share is equal to the one corre-
sponding to the minimum variance portfolio.
Note, however, that the scale effect by itself may yield a different reaction
on the part of different investors in the holdings of debt denominated in the
various currencies. From equation (12) is clear that, under the hypotheses of
this particular case, the change in the holding of foreign debt is proportional
to the change in money demand, f
U) = (1 — X
U))m
u\ where j = D, F, and
where the dot over the variable indicates the (comparative statistics) change
from one situation to another, in the current case from one with a given p to
another with a larger/?. The condition for having f
(D) <f
(F) is therefore in this












Of course, the size of the balance sheets (i.e., money demand) depends on
financing costs and is heterogeneous across agents in general. If it were to
happen that the change in money demand is the same for the two types of









The natural question is therefore, Is it reasonable to assume that the inequal-
ity in fact represents the relative behavior of domestic versus foreign investors?
As noted in section 7.2, this may or may not be the case. What is important,
however, is that the "scale" effect of money demand reduces the complicated
general structure of the model to a simple mechanism that may be confronted
with the character of available data.
7.3.2 One Intermediary and Different Degrees of Risk Aversion
In the second case, there is one agent (D) and one intermediary (F) with
different attitudes toward risk: as we shall see, the intermediary's function is a
meaningful one if this agent's risk aversion differs from that which would de-
termine the equilibrium risk premium in his absence. As the intermediary does
not hold any money, we have from equation (15) a relatively simple expression
for the equilibrium risk premium:
Uncovered interest parity holds if 1 — w
(D
) = X, of course. In general, it is now
possible to calculate the difference between the portfolio shares of the two
agents:243 Heterogeneous Behavior in Exchange Rate Crises
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> 0 and that X
(£)
) is always less than X
(F
) when there is no risk premium.
Thus, the model may rationalize heterogeneous portfolio composition (do-
mestic- vs. foreign-currency-denominated assets) without relying on asset-
preference parameters and without necessarily identifying the domestic inves-
tor as the one with a low oo. Interestingly, differences in the change of the two
agents' portfolio shares in response to sterilized intervention (an increase in
X) depend on differences in the coefficients of risk aversion. If the "foreign"
intermediary is less risk averse than the private agent, then the difference de-
creases, and the domestic investor absorbs a larger part of the central bank's
reserve loss.
7.4 Disaggregated Data
We now return to the data. The nonbanking sector balance-of-payments data
of figure 7.1 above, which still register only international transactions, may be
usefully disaggregated into domestic and foreign agents' capital inflows and
outflows. Figure 7.2 shows the behavior of net total domestic and foreign capi-
tal movements (including loans, commercial credits, and direct and portfolio
investments) from January to December 1992. Between January and May, the
cumulative inflow of foreign capital reached L 17,500 billion. The following
three months preceding the peak of the crisis see a marked slowdown in the
net inflow of foreign capital: the factors behind this are the uncertainty on the
political side, the negative effect of the insolvency of EFIM (a heavily indebted
state-owned financial holding), and the general skepticism on the progress to-
ward European integration following the result of the Danish referendum.
7.4.1 Foreign versus Domestic Investors
From our perspective, it is interesting to find that foreign investors as a
group were "convergence players" during the buildup of the crisis: a net
foreign-capital flow into Italy (and presumably into lira instruments) of some
3,000 billion during the June-August period contributed to limit the reserve
losses of the Bank of Italy and increased the lira exposure of foreign residents.
Conversely, domestic capital consistently flows out throughout the period, with
an acceleration of previous trends to a cumulative figure of 25,000 billion, of
which more than 20,000 is due to households' and firms' portfolio investments.
Additional information on the likely heterogeneity of agents within the for-
eign and domestic nonbank sectors may be obtained by looking at the gross
flows of foreign and domestic capital for portfolio investments. Figure 7.3 plots
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Fig. 7.2 Nonbank capital movements (net), 1992
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Fig. 7.3 Portfolio investments: domestic and foreign
tic and foreign agents in 1992. For both sectors, investments and disinvest-
ments tend to move in the same direction. The moderate net inflow of foreign
capital over the period is the result of large investments and disinvestments,
reaching a peak of more than 55,000 billion in June and decreasing thereafter
to a minimum of around 35,000 billion in August. To the extent that transac-245 Heterogeneous Behavior in Exchange Rate Crises
tions of opposite sign are undertaken by the same agents within a month, such
large gross figures may simply indicate high volume in the volatile April-July
period, when many within-month round-trips were probably undertaken by ac-
tive investors.
6 Such transactions were ex post inconsequential from the ex-
change rate point of view, given that no devaluation took place and exchange
rate changes were extremely limited, but may have been profitable (or un-
profitable) in light of the increasing and volatile interest rate differentials. Al-
ternatively, high volume of both investments and disinvestments may reflect
heterogeneity within the "foreign investor" aggregate—which unfortunately
remains unobservable, as the data provide no disaggregation of foreign invest-
ors' positions with Italian counterparts. Domestic capital shows the same ten-
dency, with investments and disinvestments rising until July to a peak of 45,000
and 35,000 billion, respectively. Once again, while part of this common move-
ment in capital inflows and outflows may be the result of round-trip operations
concluded within the month, the evidence may also suggest that the categories
of foreign and domestic investors consist of classes of agents characterized by
different behavior.
7.4.2 Domestic Banks and Investors
Within the banking-sector flows of figure 7.1 above, available statistics make
it possible to analyze the net banking position in foreign currency, distinguish-
ing between foreign and domestic counterparts, and to infer the extent to which
banks maintained open positions in their own account, in addition to conduct-
ing foreign-currency operations motivated by the financing and investment
needs of their domestic customers. In figure 7.4 we plot the changes (at con-
stant exchange rates) in the foreign-currency position of resident banks from
June to December 1992. We distinguish between changes due to spot opera-
tions with foreign counterparts, spot operations with domestic counterparts,
and forward transactions. The total change in the spot position with foreign
and domestic counterparts (the dashed line in fig. 7.4) shows that banks did
not appreciably modify their net portfolio in the months preceding the crisis.
Indeed, the inflow of foreign currency over June-August (by 14,700 billion,
due to an increase in foreign-currency-denominated liabilities of 8,900 billion)
was accompanied by a parallel change in the currency position with resident
counterparts by some 10,600 billion. This is the result of an increase of banks'
lending in foreign currency (mostly U.S. dollars, deutsche marks, and ECUs
[European currency units]) to domestic agents (particularly nonfinancial firms)
by 16,700 billion and an increase in liabilities (foreign-currency deposits by
residents) by 6,100 billion. It is remarkable to find that, in June and July, do-
mestic firms (and possibly households) borrowed a total of some 8,000 billion
in foreign exchange from domestic banks.
6. Official sources do not indicate how frequently (daily, weekly, or even biweekly) "gross"
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Fig. 7.4 Banks' changes in foreign-currency position
Once the change in the forward position is considered, it becomes evident
that the banks' overall position changed only slightly over the whole June-
December period (the solid line in fig. 7.4). This is most clearly visible in
September, when the spot position displayed a substantial change, resulting in
a net outflow of foreign currency by 21,700 billion, only partially matched by
a negative change in the foreign currency position toward domestic counter-
parts (due more to an increase in liabilities than to a reduction in assets). In
this month, banks changed their net forward position by 16,800 billion, deter-
mined by an increase by 25,200 billion in forward debts mostly with nonresi-
dent counterparts. Indeed, throughout the June-September period, forward op-
erations by banks were conducted mostly with nonresident agents, suggesting
that, although domestic firms increased their borrowing in foreign currency
from the banking system, they did not cover their foreign-currency position,
relying on the stability of the lira exchange rate.
As noted by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (chap. 9 in this volume), Bank
of Italy (1993), and IMF (1993), the mechanics of balance-of-payments crises
fueled by foreign speculators entail lending by domestic institutions in domes-
tic currency to foreign residents. Available data indicate that Italian banks did
not engage in such activities, but other financial intermediaries (Istituti di
Credito Speciale) did increase their foreign position in lira by some 7,000 bil-
lion between June and September. Inasmuch as it does not entail foreign ex-
change rate risk, such lending is not directly relevant to our analysis. It may
indicate, however, that some foreign agents did take short positions against the
lira, even though, on net, the foreign investor's aggregate was mildly supportive
of the lira (see fig. 7.2 above).247 Heterogeneous Behavior in Exchange Rate Crises
The distinction between households and firms within the domestic-investor
aggregate is obviously very relevant to our perspective. The UIC kindly made
some unpublished data available to us, which we plot in figures 7.5, 7.6, and
7.7 and on which we briefly comment below. In all these figures, and especially
in figure 7.5 (financial companies), we again see high volatility, which is un-
likely to be due to heterogeneity within such relatively narrow categories. We
find in figure 7.6 that domestic nonfinancial firms increased assets with foreign
counterparts by some 1,000 billion net over the period; these were presumably
not the same firms that took positions of similar size and opposite sign with
domestic banks, and it would be interesting to explore the source of such het-
erogeneous behavior. The behavior of households, in figure 7.7, is "specula-
tive" but relatively smooth, with little acceleration of the steady capital flow
resulting from the previous liberalization of cross-border financial transac-
tions.
7.4.3 Gains and Losses from Devaluation
In September, the capital-flow trends were reversed: foreign capital flows
show a negative, although small, figure of 500 billion, whereas domestic capi-
tal outflows came to a stop. However, the outflow of only 350 billion over the
whole month is likely to be the aggregate result of two very different patterns
before and after the devaluation and the suspension of the lira from the ERM.
In fact, in the following quarter, until the end of 1992, large net inflows of
domestic capital were registered, for a cumulative figure of 23,500 billion, as
portfolios were reallocated to take in profits from devaluation. Meanwhile, for-
eign capital inflows resumed with a view to exploiting capital gains generated
by the likely decreases of interest rates, contributing to rebuild the central
bank's reserves by some 7,500 billion over the final quarter of 1992. The bulk
of capital flows during the whole year, both domestic and foreign, are attribut-
able to the portfolio investment component, to which households and financial
companies are likely to contribute most.
As already said, data for September must be interpreted with care since they
possibly aggregate different behavior before and after devaluation. Moreover,
a general reason for caution is the use, by both banks and nonbanking agents,
of domestic currency swap (DCS) contracts to cover (or to take) a foreign-
currency position. Such operations have the same nature of forward transac-
tions in foreign currency but only entail payments in lire, amounting to the
difference between the spot exchange rate at the date of maturity of the opera-
tion and the rate agreed on at the contract date. Data on DCSs are available
only for the banking sector from January 1993.
7
Our model of market equilibrium under heterogeneity points out many rea-
sons why different agents may be differently exposed to the risk of devaluation.
7. Inspection of 1993 data indicates that DCSs were used by banks mainly to offset their overall
spot + forward position, which was much larger than that shown in the figure. If banks' behavior
was similar in the months of interest, when the spot + forward position of the banking sector was
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Fig. 7.6 Portfolio transactions of nonfinancial private companies
Considering a theoretical model allows several intuitive insights. The size of
interest differentials is endogenously determined by our model, so that ex ante
market equilibrium implies indifference for every agent, given expectations
and risk aversions. But, of course, heterogeneous portfolio composition (for
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Fig. 7.7 Portfolio transactions of households
tion: if and when the devaluation is realized, "convergence players" lose, while
"speculators" gain.
Starting from the evidence discussed in previous subsections, we now try
and quantify the gains and losses from devaluation for various (classes of)
agents. We first consider the buildup of the crisis (from June to August 1992),
when a generalized increase in the perceived probability of devaluation oc-
curred, leading investors to reallocate their portfolios of lira and foreign-
currency assets and liabilities. Given the yield differential prevailing through-
out the period between Italian and foreign short-term financial instruments,
such reallocations entailed gains and losses on the portfolio returns. In the
calculations, we used the spread between the Italian one-month interbank rate
and an analogous rate for Germany as a "representative" yield differential. We
also assumed that the exchange rate is fixed, given that within-band movements
of the lira nominal exchange rate were very small on a monthly average basis.
Cumulating the central bank reserve losses displayed in figure 7.1 above,
and applying the interest rate differential shown in figure 7.8 to the resulting
change in foreign-currency position between June and August, we find that the
private sector as a whole suffered an ex post interest-differential loss of L 325.9
billion. Applying the same procedure to the disaggregated capital flows of fig-
ures 7.2 and 7.4, we find that domestic investors suffered a L 276 billion loss
on account of the interest-rate differential, while foreign investors gained (if
only about L 20 billion) by playing on convergence during this period. Apart
from the current account and the "errors and omissions" entry (which may
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balance of payments on a spot basis is that labeled "authorized foreign-
currency dealers" (essentially Italian banks). As noted above, this component
appears very large in the "convergence" direction on the basis of balance-of-
payments conventions, resulting in a cumulative interest rate differential gain
of some L 175 billion; however, offsetting transactions with domestic counter-
parts reduces the gain to only 67 billion on the banks' own account, while
those domestic agents who were borrowing in foreign currency saved some L
106 billion in interest payments. Additional transactions on the forward market
further reduced the interest rate gain of banks as well as their exposure to
devaluation risk: the counterpart of such transactions is mostly nonresident
in June, while the following months see the banks engaged in intermediation
between resident and nonresident agents (nonresidents take long lira positions
with banks on a forward basis, while residents' forward contracts "will deliver"
foreign currency to banks).
In September, the lira devaluation was realized: the 7 percent devaluation of
the official ERM parity on 13 September was followed by further depreciation
after the subsequent abandonment of the ERM. For the purpose of our rough
calculations, we apply a 15 percent devaluation to the change in foreign ex-
change positions of the various categories of investors we consider. To the
change in foreign-currency exposure between June and August, we should of
course add the further investments or disinvestments in September before the
devaluation date. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, time-disaggregated
data are not available for September. Therefore, any calculation of devaluation
gains and losses necessarily relies on hypotheses about the evolution of the251 Heterogeneous Behavior in Exchange Rate Crises
agents' net position in September. In what follows, we make two simple (albeit
extreme) assumptions as to the within-month behavior of domestic and foreign
nonbank investors.
First, we may take the net change for the month of September to have oc-
curred before the devaluation: then, the cumulative central bank reserve loss
would amount to L 52,743 billion between 1 June and the devaluation date, to
imply an interest rate loss of L 744 billion and a capital gain of L 7,163 billion
for private-sector counterparts.
8 On a disaggregated basis, the total change in
domestic investors' foreign exchange positions between June and the end of
September would have afforded a capital gain of about L 3,810 billion on de-
valuation, which of course dwarfs the L 516 billion June-September loss on
interest rate differentials. Conversely, foreign investors would have suffered an
overall loss of some L 350 billion, mainly due to the L 390 billion capital loss
on devaluation. As to Italian banks, their spot position with foreign counterpart
becomes much more positive in September, both because liabilities decrease
and because assets increase (about half the net change is due to each). Their
spot position in foreign currency with domestic counterpart decreases (—5,600
billion); about half of this reflects a decline in foreign-currency loans to do-
mestic customers, the rest an increase in foreign-currency liabilities (foreign-
currency bank accounts). Overall, calculations based on cumulative spot posi-
tion changes from June to 30 September (evaluated at constant exchange rates)
say that Italian banks should have gained about L 1,700 billion as a result of a
15 percent devaluation. As we know, however, their foreign-currency position
was almost fully offset by counteracting transactions with domestic resident
participants (whose total losses would be put by these calculations at L 563
billion on account of interest differential gains, +152, and capital gain losses,
—736) and on the forward market: the Bank of Italy did not take large forward
positions (or, at least, none are apparent in available statistics), indicating that
the sizable forward positions of the Italian banking sector must have had pri-
vate counterparts.
9
Alternatively, we may try and estimate devaluation gains and losses allowing
for a reversal of capital flows within the month of September. For example, we
can impute all the gross outflows registered in September to the period before
the devaluation. This admittedly extreme assumption would see domestic in-
vestors reducing their exposure to devaluation by some L 56,000 billion in the
first half of the month: then, the cumulative change in their foreign-currency
8. Our model could be readily extended to allow for interactions between different central
banks: in fact, the Bank of Italy's "reserve loss" largely consisted of an increase in official short-
term liabilities (L 20,000 billion were obtained from the ERM short-term loan facility, and L 2,300
billion were drawn [in deutsche marks] from a Bank for International Settlements credit line).
Such positions, which on devaluation result in transfers between different countries' official insti-
tutions, are not directly relevant for the calculations that we perform here.
9. This is in interesting contrast with the Swedish data that we plan to analyze in future work.
In Sweden, the private sector took positions against the krona mainly in the forward market, and
the Swedish central bank absorbed such positions in the crisis period.252 Fabio C. Bagliano, Andrea Beltratti, and Giuseppe Bertola
holdings since June would imply a capital gain of over L 12,000 billion from
a 15 percent devaluation, and a large part of these would have been realized in
the second half of the month, as the gross inflows of about L 57,000 billion
would be the result of profit-taking portfolio reallocations under the assump-
tion under consideration. The even larger gross flows in foreign investors' port-
folios would similarly imply capital gains or losses on the order of L 10,000
billion.
7.5 Concluding Comments
This paper has tried to bring theoretical analysis and Italian data to bear on
the redistributive effects of an exchange rate crisis. These take place certainly
between central banks and the private sector as a whole and, to the extent that
different agents' behavior is heterogeneous, also across different classes of
private investors.
While the theoretical model that we have set out is admittedly very simple,
it suggests that economic theory may be able to rationalize differences in the
behavior of "foreign" versus "domestic" agents, or of end users of liquidity
versus financial intermediaries, without resorting to differences of opinion or
information across such classes of investors. As we feel that it is conceptually
unappealing to allow for heterogeneous expectations, we would prefer to try
and rationalize what evidence is available, extending standard models to ac-
count for investor heterogeneity under different and more readily interpret-
able respects.
Understanding the welfare effects of currency crises may be relevant to a
better understanding of alternative exchange rate regimes. No exchange rate is
truly and permanently fixed, and the welfare effects of exchange rate crises
may be so large as to outweigh the gains from periods of relative exchange rate
stability. Even disregarding such normative issues, however, further theoretical
and empirical work on the microfoundations of transactions that result in re-
serve loss is certainly relevant to the mechanics of exchange rate crises and of
their resolution.
Allowing for heterogeneous behavior across different classes of investor is
likely to afford further insights in future research. Of course, not all dimen-
sions of heterogeneity are necessarily relevant to the problem at hand: to the
extent that different portfolio positions reflect unexplained "noise" and cancel
each other out, they may be safely disregarded at the aggregate level. Useful
theoretical models need to address heterogeneity not only across a central bank
and a vaguely defined "market" but also across agents whose different objec-
tive functions and constraints are readily interpretable from an economic point
of view and, one hopes, observable in the data. To an investment banker, an
exchange rate crisis may be an opportunity to "ride the tide" and come out of
the crisis with as large a portfolio value as might be obtained by moving from
one currency to the other: such speculative objectives are sought by investors253 Heterogeneous Behavior in Exchange Rate Crises
of this type, who face few institutional constraints on their portfolio policies.
To a household that is simply concerned with the consumption of a basket of
domestic good, the crisis need not be as exciting until its final effects on prices
and/or wages unfold: even though a rational wealth maximizer should never
give up the opportunity to increase wealth with a timely round-trip in foreign
currency, suitable investment vehicles need not be readily available to house-
holds and other unsophisticated investors.
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Comment Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi
The paper by Bagliano, Beltratti, and Bertola (henceforth BBB) can be broadly
divided into two parts. In the first, the authors develop a theoretical model in
which heterogeneous investor behavior is explained on the basis of differences
in terms of agents' degree of risk aversion, asset preference, and objective
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function, while assuming, instead, for the purpose of the analysis, homoge-
neous expectations. In the second part, BBB examine Italian balance-of-
payments data to assess possible heterogeneity in agents' behavior and esti-
mate the effect of the September 1992 devaluation of the lira in terms of gains
and losses for the central bank, residents, and nonresidents.
My comments concentrate on the second part. They mainly address the
question of using balance-of-payments data for the analysis of heterogeneous
behavior. It is suggested that great caution is required in the use of such data
because of their limited quality and significance and that their usefulness for
the analysis may be seriously impaired.
Balance-of-payments data may seem an obvious choice for the analysis of
heterogeneous behavior since they report transactions between buyers and sell-
ers of financial assets. However, not much further information on these agents
is provided, except that they are located in different countries, which makes it
very difficult to assess heterogeneity on the basis of possible differences in risk
aversion, asset preference, or objective function, the main features of BBB's
theoretical model. Furthermore, balance-of-payments data have several short-
comings. First, their statistical accuracy is rather limited, even in industrial
countries. Looking in particular at Italian data, it is noticeable that in the period
June-August 1992 the "errors and omissions" were recorded at L 11 trillion,
about half the size of the change in official reserves and nearly three times the
current account balance. More important, international banking statistics,
which are generally considered to be more reliable, show for Italian banks an
enormous discrepancy between assets and liabilities: L 65 trillion in September
1992 (20 more than in January 1992), which is more than half their net external
asset position.
Second, balance-of-payments statistics do not provide full information on
the currency denomination of assets and liabilities sold or acquired by resi-
dents and nonresidents in a given period. It is therefore very difficult to draw
inferences concerning the effect of balance-of-payments transactions on cur-
rency diversification or to calculate who lost and who gained from a devalua-
tion. This shortcoming might have become particularly relevant for Italy in
view of the rapid development of the Eurolira market, which led to a substan-
tial increase in lira-denominated flows of funds between the domestic market
and the Euromarket.
Third, balance-of-payments statistics do not record a wide set of transac-
tions undertaken by residents and nonresidents aimed at hedging the risk in-
curred in foreign exchange operations, for instance, domestic currency swaps.
The data for the latter were not recorded by Italian banking statistics before
the end of 1992. However, the data available thereafter show that the amount
of such transactions has been comparable to the currency exposure of banks,
suggesting that not taking this type of information into account may lead to
biased conclusions.255 Heterogeneous Behavior in Exchange Rate Crises
Let me turn now to some of the findings of the paper and indicate how they
may be affected by the above comments.
In section 7.4.1, BBB note that, during the buildup of the crisis (June-
August 1992), Italy recorded an inflow of foreign capital while residents were
increasing their outflows, which would suggest that, while the former were
"convergence players," the latter were instead diversifying their portfolio away
from lira-denominated assets. This conclusion may not be fully justified. First,
the acquisition of foreign assets by residents and nonresidents should be
viewed as part of their respective portfolio diversification strategies; account
should also be taken of investment in domestic assets. In the case of Italy,
residents' acquisition of foreign assets must also be viewed in terms of the
portfolio adjustment that took place after the liberalization of capital move-
ments in 1990. The developments mentioned by BBB could therefore be con-
sistent with homogeneous behavior if residents and nonresidents increased
their respective holdings of foreign assets as part of a similar portfolio diversi-
fication process.
Second, balance-of-payments data do not indicate whether the foreign in-
flows of capital recorded in the summer of 1992 implied an increase in nonresi-
dents' long lira positions or whether they were instead covered for the ex-
change rate risk. Similarly, the outflow of funds by Italian residents may to a
large extent have been accompanied by borrowing in foreign currency, as bank-
ing statistics indicate, or other forms of hedging against exchange rate risk.
The larger the hedging component, which is not reported in balance-of-
payments data, the more residents and nonresidents' behavior may in fact have
been rather homogeneous while appearing different. A definite answer requires
more information than is provided in figure 7.2.
Another statement in section 7.4.3 suggests that after the devaluation Italian
residents sold back foreign assets "to take in profits from devaluation" while
nonresidents were resuming inflows "with a view to exploiting capital gains
generated by the likely decreases of interest rates, contributing to rebuild the
central bank's reserves by some 7,500 billion over the final quarter of 1992."
This apparent difference in behavior may not correspond to reality as the in-
crease in official reserves was obtained mainly through swaps with commercial
banks of funds mostly borrowed abroad by the latter. More generally, the re-
flow of capital by residents seems to have been accompanied by hedging of the
foreign exchange risk through operations that, as BBB suggest, may have taken
the form of domestic currency swaps. Indeed, the developments in the ex-
change rate of the lira after the devaluation of September 1992 confirm that
the reflow of portfolio capital was largely hedged by both residents and nonres-
idents. This would suggest that, even after the devaluation of the lira, residents
and nonresidents displayed rather similar investment behavior.
In section 7.4.3, BBB seem to determine who lost and who gained from the







































256 Fabio C. Bagliano, Andrea Beltratti, and Giuseppe Bertola














Of which foreign official debt
b
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especially in view of the comments made above, that is, that balance-of-
payments data do not indicate the extent to which foreign exchange risk is
hedged. Furthermore, BBB conduct this exercise on the basis of flow data, that
is, the changes in the portfolios of residents and nonresidents, rather than on
the stocks of assets and liabilities underlying the net external position of Italy.
The data on stocks at the end of 1991 show that Italian residents held L 488.3
trillion of foreign assets, of which 95.9 trillion was official reserves, while
foreign liabilities amounted to 608.7 trillion. The data can be updated to Sep-
tember 1992, using balance-of-payments data, in particular to take account of
the decrease in official reserves (by 59 trillion) and the increase in private resi-
dents' foreign assets. However, no estimate is yet available of the currency
composition of the flows during these nine months.
Conducting the exercise on the basis of end-1991 data (table 7C.1) shows
that, excluding official reserves, the private sector held L 329.6 trillion of assets
denominated in foreign currency, as against 310.8 trillion of liabilities. Thus,
the net foreign currency position of the Italian private sector was slightly posi-
tive, by L 18.8 trillion. Its net position in lire was negative, by 235.2 trillion. A
devaluation of the lira, with unchanged end-1991 stocks, improved the already
positive net foreign asset position of Italian residents, measured in lire; con-
versely, it worsened the net position of nonresidents vis-a-vis Italy, measured
in foreign currency.
The above considerations suggest that the gains and losses calculated on
existing stocks are much larger than those measured by BBB on the basis of
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therefore need to be conducted on the basis of an integrated stock-flow
analysis.
Given the shortcomings of balance-of-payments data, one possibility for fur-
ther analysis of heterogeneity would be to use survey data. The Group of Ten
conducted an assessment of the causes of the 1992 crisis on the basis of a
survey of the behavior of financial intermediaries in the major countries. In
Italy's case, some interesting features emerge from the survey:
• Although market participants developed a common assessment of the causes
of the September 1992 crisis and behaved in a similar way, nonresident fi-
nancial institutions appear to have been more active than the resident ones.
• When the crisis became more acute, the behavior of the various operators
became more similar, as "all participants were on the same side of the
market."
• The lira exchange market appears to be structured in a somewhat peculiar
way, with two tiers: the first made up of a handful of large institutional invest-
ors that sometimes take very large positions and appear to have an informa-
tion advantage and to play a role in forming the views of other participants;
the second tier is made up of minor Italian marketmakers and final custom-
ers, who are largely price takers and generally more cautious.
The survey analysis points to heterogeneous behavior in the foreign ex-
change market, although in terms not of residents and nonresidents but of mar-
ketmakers and others, leaders and followers. To a certain extent, the distinction
may overlap with that of balance-of-payments since most marketmakers are
foreign financial institutions, but the analytic and policy implications may be
different.
These, however, are only suggestions for further analysis of a subject that
appears to be of particular interest for the understanding of the functioning of
foreign exchange markets. It is a merit of BBB's paper to have contributed and
stimulated the discussion on this issue.
Comment Richard K. Lyons
The paper's main objectives are (i) to demonstrate empirically that position
taking in 1992 differed across groups and (ii) to rationalize those differences
without resorting to differential information. My comments pertain more to
the latter. I will begin with some broader observations and then move to the
model's specifics.
Richard K. Lyons is associate professor in the Hass School of Business at the University of
California, Berkeley, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.258 Fabio C. Bagliano, Andrea Beltratti, and Giuseppe Bertola
First, I want to link this paper to the topic of the conference, namely, micro-
structure. Microstructure, broadly defined, encompasses at least three dimen-
sions of the market: (1) physical structure (e.g., number of dealers), (2) infor-
mational structure (e.g., transparency of order flow), and (3) agent structure
(e.g., discretionary vs. nondiscretionary liquidity traders). The contact point
between microstructure and the Bagliano, Beltratti, and Bertola (henceforth
BBB) paper is squarely in the third dimension—agent structure—the first two
dimensions playing no role in their model. In BBB, what distinguishes a class
of agents is the direct linkage to the domestic money supply: nominal domestic
balances enter utility directly, together with the cost of providing domestic bal-
ances.
Next, I want to comment on the association between crises and microstruc-
ture, an association that runs through much of part II of this volume. This focus
might lead one to believe that the impetus for foreign exchange microstructure
comes largely from EMS (European Monetary System) crises. My view is dif-
ferent. In my view, the impetus for microstructure comes primarily from the
floating experience: (i) extraordinary volume, both levels and growth; (ii) in-
creased volatility under floating without increased volatility of fundamentals;
(iii) the 1980s dollar cycle; and (iv) forward discount bias. (Microstructural
tools are well suited to address the first two; the last two are tougher.) To help
judge the impetus from EMS crises, I pose the following question: If the float-
ing dollar had never occurred and all we had were the experiences of the EMS,
would we be pursuing microstructure at this juncture? I suspect not.
I turn now to the BBB model. Some models are easier to take to the data
than others. This model is one of the others. The result is a virtual decoupling
of their two central objectives: empirical demonstration of differential position
taking and theoretical rationalization without differential information. Al-
though the authors are careful not to oversell the paper's connection of those
objectives, the marriage is uneasy nonetheless.
That said, the model is insightful in its integration of money demand with
portfolio choice. This is achieved by specifying the (domestic) public's balance
sheet as equal to the flip side of the central bank's balance sheet. A cost of this
approach is that the portfolio decision is therefore rather limited; but this cost
is small in relation to the elegance of the approach.
In the model, the central bank is passive. Its balance sheet is determined by
the portfolio choice of the public. In choosing its portfolio, the public trades
off the utility derived from (nominal) monetary assets against the disutility
from the liabilities that finance the monetary assets. The disutility from the
liabilities has two sources: (i) debt servicing costs and (ii) variability in debt
servicing costs. Crisis (devaluation) influences the public's trade-off through
both these sources since the cost of debt is a function of the stochastic ex-
change rate. From this structure, the authors are able to derive equilibrium
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preference, or asset preference, the authors can rationalize differential position
taking without resorting to differential information.
There are a number of nagging issues within the original version that the
authors should clarify. I will touch on three in particular. First, where do the
nominal interest rates come from in this model? These are central to determin-
ing the cost of the public's liabilities. Although they appear exogenous through
the derivation of market equilibrium, the authors' example has the domestic
rate moving with a change in the probability of devaluation.
The second nagging issue is the evolution of the central bank's balance
sheet. What does it look like at t = 1? Where does the return on its assets
enter? Why doesn't the (domestic) public internalize this? Clarification along
these lines will help support the sharp dichotomy between central bank and
public.
The third nagging issue is their first simple case. In particular, the experi-
ment considers an exogenous increase in the probability of devaluation p under
heterogeneous asset preferences, domestic versus foreign. It is not clear why
the derivative of equation (11) has the sign it does. The authors should clarify
the assumptions required (note that p[\ — p] is maximized when p = 1/2).
Further, if the interest rate moves, what determines how much it moves? In its
current state, their first case has too much in the background to provide the
clarity it might have.
I close with two perspective comments. First, the concept of a completely
passive central bank in the face of a crisis makes it especially difficult to har-
monize the two parts of the paper—empirical and theoretical. This contributes
substantially to the uneasy marriage noted above. Finally, the authors' distaste
for heterogeneous expectations motivates them to look toward heterogeneity
in risk aversion, liquidity preference, and asset preference. I do not share their
distaste: an increasing body of empirical work supports the presence of hetero-
geneity in expectations. They describe their mechanism as "more readily inter-
pretable." But how much can be said empirically about heterogeneity in risk
aversion or liquidity preference? Is heterogeneous asset preference truly in the
set of deep parameters, or is it something to be derived? How much do we
learn about differential position taking from a model that starts with differen-
tial asset preference?